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1. Introduction 
Can negative externalities generate multiple and indeterminate equilibria in an endogenous 
growth model?  The answer appears to be negative in existing literatures.  However, this paper 
shows that a negative externality in association with public goods services (the congestion effect) 
can lead to local indeterminacy in a constant-return, two-sector, human capital enhanced 
endogenous growth model.  Local indeterminacy emerges because under constant returns in 
production, a sufficiently strong congestion effect makes the marginal products of physical and 
human capital, while decreasing from a firm’s perspective, to increase in a social perspective.             
Several economic growth models have recently established the existence of indeterminate 
equilibrium paths.    The indeterminacy of equilibrium paths is significant as it lays the groundwork 
for endogenous growth fluctuations that provide for an explanation for large, persistent variations 
in growth experiences, where different countries follow different equilibrium trajectories toward a 
balanced growth path. Conventional wisdom generates endogenous growth fluctuations based on 
increasing returns in production, including those analyzed in a one-sector model (e.g., Benhabib 
and Farmer, 1994; Boldrin and Rustichini, 1994) and those explored in a two-sector model (e.g., 
Benhabib and Perli, 1994; Xie, 1994).  These two-sector paradigms were extrapolated in the 
Lucas (1988)-Uzawa (1965) type of human capital enhanced models.  While in these two-sector 
models increasing returns generate local indeterminacy, there are other two-sector, human capital 
enhanced models with constant returns where local indeterminacy depends on other devices.
1    
Two mechanisms are employed to generate local indeterminacy in these constant-return, 
two-sector, human capital enhanced growth models. One of the mechanisms is to introduce 
sector-specific externalities.  Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura (2000) and Mino (2001) belong to 
this line of thought and establish the existence of indeterminacy in a two-sector, constant-return 
model with sector-specific externalities. The other mechanism is distortionary factor taxation.  
Bond, Wang and Yip (1996) limit the government activity to the collection of taxes and payment of 
transfers, and find that the balanced growth path is locally indeterminate if the factor tax rates are 
very different both across sectors and across factors.  Raurich (2001) extends the model and 
shows that with the consideration of unproductive public spending, indeterminacy is empirically 
plausible.  Finally, Ben-Gad (2003) combines both the distortionary factor taxation and the 
                                                      
1 Indeterminacy also arises from other mechanisms in two-sector overlapping generation models (Reichlin, 
1992, Michel and Venditti, 1997), and in two-sided search models (Laing, Palivos and Wang, 1995; Chen, 
Mo and Wang, 2002).    See an extensive survey in Benhabib and Farmer (1999). 
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sector-specific externalities in an endogenous growth model with unproductive government 
spending, and finds that indeterminacy is not possible when either one of the two mechanisms is 
added to the model in isolation.  With elastic labor supply and physical capital employed in both 
sectors, indeterminacy emerges for varying combinations of factor taxation and sector-specific 
externalities.   
The purpose of this paper is to introduce another mechanism for local indeterminacy in a 
constant-return, two-sector, human capital enhanced model, with productive public spending in the 
fashion à la Barro (1990), financed by the income taxation in the goods sector.  The use of a 
productive public goods service is subject to an external congestion effect in association with the 
quantity of aggregate physical as well as human capital used in the economy. We establish local 
indeterminate equilibria by calibrating the model based on the U.S. economy.  Under different 
values of the congestion parameter, we simulate the value of the region of the external effect of 
public goods services upon the goods sector and the education sector.    We find the conditions for 
local indeterminacy can occur under realistic parameter values.   
The possibility of local indeterminacy materializes because the congestion effect makes the 
marginal product in a social perspective to deviate from that of the firm’s perspective.  The 
marginal product of human/physical capital in the goods sector is decreasing in the fraction of 
human/physical capital employed in the sector from a private perspective, but it is increasing from 
a social perspective because of the presence of the congestion effect.         
Under the requirement of constant returns to scale in a technology, the public service 
congestion reduces the contribution of public capital services and increases the contribution of the 
other two inputs.    As a result, the public service congestion mitigates the direct negative effect of 
larger human (resp. physical) capital upon the marginal product of human (resp. physical) capital.  
When the degree of public service congestion is sufficiently large, the indirect positive effect from 
the resulting larger physical (resp. human) capital because of the Pareto complements between 
physical and human capital, dominates the direct negative effect, thereby making the net marginal 
product of human (resp. physical) capital in the goods sector to increase in the amount of human 
(resp. physical) capital employed in this sector. 
When marginal product is decreasing at the firm level, larger physical capital stock reduces 
the rewards to physical capital relative to the rewards to human capital.  However, at a social 
perspective, such larger physical capital stock increases the ratio of the marginal products of human 
capital in the goods sector to that in the education sector.  In order to equalize the marginal 
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product of human capital in both sectors, human capital is optimally reallocated from the goods to 
the education sector, and with the Pareto complements in human and physical capital more physical 
capital is employed in the education sector.    As a result, output in the goods sector decreases while 
output in the education sector increases, in so doing resulting in a higher shadow price of the goods 
relative to the education.     
The above result indicates that the Rybczynski theorem fails.  As a duality, the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem also stops working, and thereby a rise in the reward of physical capital 
relative to human capital results in a fall in the price of the goods.  When the representative agent 
expects a higher price of the goods relative to the education, it would increase physical capital 
accumulation, as the goods sector is more physical capital intensive from its own perspectives.  
Such an increase in physical capital accumulation leads to reallocation of human capital, and the 
resulting reallocation of physical capital, from the goods sector to the education sector.  As a 
consequence, output in the goods sector decreases relative to output in the education sector, thereby 
resulting in a higher price of the goods relative to the education.  Therefore, the expectations are 
self-fulfilling in equilibrium.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. While Section 2 sets up the basic model and 
analyzes the balanced growth path, Section 3 analyzes and quantitatively assesses the possibility of 
equilibrium indeterminacy.    In Section 4 the reasons underlying local indeterminacy are explored.   
Finally, some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.   
 
2. The  Model 
2.1 The Environment 
The model is based upon Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Bond, Wang and Yip (1996).    The 
economy is comprised of a representative agent and two production sectors. In the two sectors, 
referred to as the goods sector, Y, and the education sector, X, both human and physical capital are 
necessary inputs, with their productivity enhanced, but with a congestion effect, by public spending 
in each sector. 
More specifically, the technology in both sectors is of constant returns, and to simplify the 
analysis a Cobb-Douglas form is employed as follows: 
                       ( 2 . 1 )   ( ) ( ) , (0) 0 (0) 0 , y y A vk uh G k and h given
αβ γ => >
                  [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] , x x Bv k u h G
η θδ =− −                         ( 2 . 2 )  
in which 0<v<1 and 0<u<1 are the share of physical, k, and human capital, h, respectively, 
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allocated to the goods sector. Parameters A>0 and B>0 are productivity coefficients; 0<α<1 
(0<η<1) and 0<β<1 (0<θ<1) are the shares of physical and human capital in the goods (education) 
sector.  In addition, Gy (Gx) is the perceived amount of public goods services received by the 
representative agent in the goods (education) sector, with parameter γ (δ) representing the degree to 
which the public spending affects the productivity in the goods (education) sector, respectively. 
  The perceived amount of public goods services received by the representative agent is 
assumed to be the same in the two sectors and is given in the following form,





ψ == ⋅  (2.3) 
where G is aggregate public spending, and K and H are aggregate private physical and human 
capital, respectively.  Parameter ψ indicates the degree of congestion, and if ψ=0, the public 
service is non-rival and non-excludable and is therefore a pure public good. 
  The following parametric restrictions are imposed. 
Assumption 1 ( i) , 0 > −γψ α  , 0 > −γψ β  , 0 > −δψ η and ; 0 > −δψ θ  
(ii)  γ γψ β α − = − + 1 2  and  δ δψ θ η − = − + 1 2  
(iii) 0 < ψ ≤ 0.5. 
 
While Assumption (i) assures that physical capital and human capital are productive in both 
sectors in an aggregate economy, Assumption (ii) imposes constant returns to scale in all growing 
inputs, i.e., K, H and G, in order to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path.  Finally, in 
Assumption (iii) while restriction ψ>0 makes certain a congestion effect, ψ≤0.5 ensures the 
dominance of the positive effects of public spending service over the congestion effect. 
Public spending is financed by income taxes in the goods sector, with a flat income tax rate, 
τ>0, as in Barro (1990) and many others.    For simplicity, we also assume there is no depreciation 
for the stocks of physical and human capital. As a result, the motions of the two kinds of capital 
stock for the representative agent are given by: 
(1 ) ky τ c = −−                             ( 2 . 4 a )  
hx =                              ( 2 . 4 b )  
The preference of the representative agent is assumed to possess a discounted lifetime utility, 
                                                      
2 The parametric form follows from Turnovsky (1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), which indicates 
that an individual’s usage of the public services is congested by the aggregate usage making the congestion 
effect to increase in the absolute size of the economy. 
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− ∫ t                             ( 2 . 5 )  
in which parameter ρ>0 is the instantaneous time-preference rate, and σ is the reciprocal of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.   
Finally, to complete the model, the government budget constraints need to balance: 
. Y G τ =                                  ( 2 . 6 )  
 
2.2 The Optimization and Equilibrium 
Given the tax rates, public spending and initial k(0) and h(0), the representative agent’s 
problem is to choose c, v, u, k and h, in order to maximize its discounted lifetime utility in (2.5), 
subject to constraints in (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), and (2.4a.b). Denote λ and µ as the co-state variables 
associated with k and h,  respectively.  Then,  the  necessary conditions are:   
, c
σ λ





λτ α µ η −=
x
−





λτ β µ θ −=
x
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λ τβ µ θ ρ µ µ − += −                        ( 2 . 7 e )  











  Condition (2.7a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal cost, the shadow 
price of physical capital, while (2.7b) and (2.7c) equate the marginal product of physical capital 
and human capital between the goods and the education sector.  Finally, (2.7d) and (2.7e) are the 
Euler equations governing the optimal accumulation for physical and human capital, respectively. 
 
Proposition 1 The share of human capital and the share of physical capital employed in the final 
goods sector are positively related. 
Proof:    If we divide (2.7b) by (2.7c), we get   









u , <                       ( 2 . 8 )  
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which leads to ν′(u)>0.   
 
The positive relationship between v and u results from the Pareto complements in physical and 
human capital in the technology.    We are now ready to define the market equilibrium. 
 
Definition: Given an income tax rate τ and initial physical and human capital K(0) and H(0), a 
perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) is a tuple    
that satisfies: 
, / , , , / , / , / , / , / { K K u v H G H G H G H X H Y x y 
} , , / , / µ λ C C H H  
(i)   production  technologies,  (2.1), (2.2), (2.3); 
(ii)  household budget constraint and law of motions, (2.4a-b); 
(iii) household  optimization,  (2.7a)-(2.7e), together with the two transversality conditions; 
(iv)  government budget constraints, (2.6).  
 
An economic system with non-stationary variables is difficult to analyze.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to transform the system into a tractable one with stationary variables.    Following Bond, 
Wang and Yip (1996) we transform the economic system into the structure with variables {p, s, z}, 
where p≡µ/λ, s≡C/H, and z≡K/H. In the following we briefly describe the transformation, with 
detailed mathematical derivation found in the Appendix.   
Next, if we utilize (2.7c-2.7e) and (2.6), we rewrite (2.7b) as 
,
) (
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and  )]. ( ) ( [ 1 α β δ η θ γ ψ ηβ αθ − − − − − = Λ  
Using relationship in (2.8), (2.9a) can be rewritten as   
 u =u(p, z),    (2.9b) 
 
with  , 0   if   0
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 and  
[] ) )( 2 ( ) 2 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ] [ 1 1 δ γ ψ ψ γ δ αθ ηβ αθ − − − − − − + − Λ − = Γ u v u v .  
  Finally, while (2.7b) and (2.7d) lead to an expression for , λ
λ
  (2.7c) and (2.7e) yield an 
expression for  ,
µ
µ
   and (2.7a) and (2.7d) lead the following relationship 
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Moreover, (2.4a), with (2.7b, d) and (2.6), yields an expression for , K
K
   whereas (2.4b), along 
with (2.7c, e) and (2.6), leads to an expression for  . H
H
   Therefore, we transform the equilibrium 
conditions into a stationary system as follows, 
( 1 )((,) ,) ((,) ,) ,
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System (2.11a)-(2.11c) determines p, s and z.    Using the results, we determine u and v using 






H , thus ,
Gx
H  are determined using (2.1), 








  and  ,
µ
µ
  are determined from (2.7a), 
(2.4a), (2.4b), (2.7d) and (2.7e).           
 
2.3 Balanced Growth Path 
We now analyze the equilibrium in a steady state. A steady-state equilibrium is a PFE with a 
balanced growth path (BGP) under which great ratios p, s and z and fractions u and v are constant, 
and the quantity variables grow at a constant rate.  As a result,  0 / / / = = = z z s s p p     in 
(2.11a)-(2.11c) along a BGP. Therefore,  and are constant and 
equal in a BGP. To determine a BGP, we substitute (2.11a) into (2.11b) to obtain: 
/, /, /,/, / CCKKHHYYX X    / GG 
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. σ αθ αθ η β >+ +− +  
 
  We are now ready to analyze the existence and uniqueness of a non-degenerate BGP.  We 
establish the result in three steps.   
First, examining (2.12), the right-hand side is 0<ρ/σ<∞, while the left-hand side is a function 
of u, whose value is zero at u=(σ−θ)/σ, a positive value under Condition S, is increasing in u for 
u≥(σ−θ)/σ,
4 and is approaching ∞ at u =1.  Therefore, there exists a unique interior u
* in a BGP 





















*<1 into  0 p =   in (2.11a) yields (1−τ)r
*=w
*>0, which determines a 
unique  p
*.  Substituting p*  into  0 s =   in (2.11b) leads to 
** 1
[(1 ) ( ( , ), ) ] rup z p τ ρ
σ
− −=  
 and  determines  z*.  Finally,  (1−τ)r(u(p







and    in (2.11c) lead to s=z 0 z = 
*[v/α−(1−u)/θ]w
*>0 under Condition S. 
Finally, using (2.11a) and (2.11b) along the BGP, we obtain  *














<<   As a consequence, the economic growth rate in (2.10) is positive along the BGP.   
                                                      
3 Condition S is easily met as σ>1, α+θ<2, (α−θ)
2<1 and 4ηβ<4.  For example, suppose γ=δ=.08, ψ=.25, 
α=.3, β=.64, η=.24, and θ=.7 so production functions in both sectors satisfy constant returns to scale. Then 
the right hand side of Condition S is less than 0.96.     
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 We summarize the above results in:   
                                  
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and Condition S, there exists a unique balanced growth path 
with a positive economic growth rate.   
 
3 Transitional Dynamics 
3.1 Local Dynamics 
To investigate the local dynamics of the economic system, we take a linear Taylor’s expansion 
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The Jacobean matrix in (3.1), denoted as J, determines the local dynamic properties of the 
economic system.  The 3x3 system includes a state-like variable, whose initial value z(0) is 
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predetermined, and two control-like variables, p and s, which can adjust instantaneously.  
Therefore, the equilibrium path in the neighborhood of the unique BGP is locally determinate if the 
Jacobean matrix has only one eigenvalue with negative real parts (stable roots).    In contrast, if the 
Jacobean matrix has two, or a larger number of, eigenvalues with negative real parts, then the 
equilibrium path near the unique BGP is locally indeterminate. 
According to the Routh-Hurwitz theorem, the number of characteristic roots with positive real 
parts equals the number of variations of signs in  { 1, , / , }, TrJ BJ DetJ TrJ DetJ − −+  in  which  TrJ, 
BJ and DetJ denote the trace, the determinant of the Bordered Hessian, and the determinant of 
matrix J, respectively.   It follows that there is a total of eight possible types of variations in sign. 
In Table 1, the first four rows exhibit cases in which the number of changes in signs are less than or 
equal to one and thus the number of eigenvalues with negative real parts is larger than or equal to 
two.    If any of the cases in the first four rows in Table 1 emerges in equilibrium, then the BGP is 
locally indeterminate. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 





(1 ) 1 1 1
( )[1 ( ) ] (2 )[( (1 )]
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δβ γ ψ ψ γ ψ η δ ψ
σ θθ
⎧⎫ Λ −− − ⎛⎞ ⎡ =− − − + + − − + − ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎣ Γ− ⎝⎠ ⎩⎭
+  
The terms in the large braces in DetJ are positive under Condition S.    Therefore, the sign of 





1 () ( 1 ) ( 1 )
     [( ( ) ( ))( ) (1 )] [2 (1 ) ] [ ( )(2 ) ]
vu
vu v u
αθ ηβ δ γ αθ
ψ γ θ η δ β α αθ ηβ δ γ αθ ψ γ δ αθ
Γ≡ − − + −
−− − − − − + − + − − −
   (3.2) 
 
The sign of DetJ is important in determining the local dynamics of the model. If the number 
of negative roots is smaller than 3,
5 local indeterminacy is generally associated with a positive 
value of DetJ and thereby, a negative value of Γ1.
6    To study the possibility of local indeterminacy, 
we investigate the elements in Γ1.   
    The first large braces in Γ1 involve only those of standard effects, whereas the second large 
braces contain those of public spending effects and the third large braces include those in relation 
                                                      
5 As our simulation results below show, it is impossible to obtain three negative roots in this dynamic system 
in the range of appropriate parameter space.    As a result, local indeterminacy arises in this model only in the 
situation with a positive determinant for the Jacobean matrix, i.e. Γ1<0.   
 
6 Even though a source is also associated with a positive determinant, it also requires with other conditions. 
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to congestion effects.
7    If public spending is not productive, then γ=δ=0 and this model is reduced 
an otherwise standard model (e.g., Rebelo, 1991) with Γ1=Γ1
1≡ (αθ−ηβ)
2v(1−u)>0 entailing only a 
standard effect.  If the public services are productive, pure public good, then γ>0, δ>0, ψ=0, and 
Γ1=Γ1
2≡Γ1
1+δ(1−γ)αθ>0 and is even larger than Γ1
1.   
In contrast, when a congestion effect emerges in the use of the public services, Γ1 is the 
complicated form in (3.2), which is smaller than Γ1
2 through the third braces.    Envisaging the third 
large braces, the first brackets arise from the interaction of the congestion effect with the standard 
effect, while the second brackets come from the crowding out of the public services due to the 
congestion effect and the third brackets appear in relation to an asymmetry in the congestion effects 
in the use of public services between the two sectors.    It is easier to envisage the signs of Γ1 if we 
rewrite (3.2) to obtain: 
 
   11 {( ) (1 )} { (1 )(1 2 ) } { (2 )( ) } vu v u αθη β δ γ ψ α θ ψ δγ α θ Γ= − Λ − + − − + − − −     ( 3 . 3 )  
In the above expression, the first large braces are positive as Λ1 is generally positive, and the 
second large braces are also positive under ψ≤0.5.   In order to obtain Γ1<0, the third large braces 
must be negative, which is possible only if γ>δ and ψ is sufficiently large.    While γψ presents the 
congestion effect in Sector Y, δψ is the congestion effect in Sector X.  It is necessary that the 
congestion effect in Sector Y dominates the congestion effect in Sector X, in order to obtain Γ1<0.  
However, the signs of TrJ and –BJ+DetJ/TrJ are too complicated to conduct an algebraic 
analysis.  In the following we calibrate the model economy and quantitatively envisage the 
possibility of local indeterminacy.     
 
3.2 Calibrating the Model Economy 
We now calibrate the model economy.  We start by choosing parameter values, followed by 
solving the endogenous variables in a BGP.  Finally, we establish the values of TrJ, BJ and DetJ 
of the Jacobean matrix J, and determine the signs of eigenvalues.   
We normalize the parameter values for the productivity coefficient in Sector Y by A=1. We 
calibrate the economy based upon the following parameter values representative of the economy in 
                                                      
7 In conventional works, elements in Γ1 include only those in the first large braces, so we refer to them as a 
standard effect.    With the consideration of productive public spending, the effect appears in the second large 
braces in Γ1, thus referred to as a public spending effect.    Finally, when the congestion effects emerge in the 
use of the public services, the third large braces appear in Γ1, and thereby are referred to as a congestion 
effect.  
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the U.S. and consistent with a 2% long-run, real economic growth rate.     
The total tax revenues in the US, on average, account for 20% of its GDP after 1980, and 
hence τ=20% is chosen.  Following Turnovsky (2000) we choose the degree of externality of 
public spending upon the goods sector at γ=0.08; in a similar and symmetric fashion, we set the 
degree of externality of public spending upon the education sector at δ=0.08.    Finally, there are no 
estimates for the degree of congestion.  We choose the median value, ψ=0.25, to represent the 
degree of congestion. We must point out that different sets of values for ψ will not change the 
quantitative results, as the resulting calibrated value for B below is insensitive to a different value 
of ψ.  
For the time preference rate, ρ, we set it at 0.025 in accordance with Benhabib and Perli 
(1994). As to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, we set σ=1.5 and consistence with 
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) and Ben-Gad (2003). Finally, following  Ben-Gad (2003), 
Benhabib and Perli (1994), and Raurich (2001), α=0.3 and η=0.2 are chosen.
8  With  the  degree  of 
public spending externality and under a constant return to scale technology, the share of human 
capital in the goods and the education sector, β and θ, is implied.  Using the above parameter 
values, we calibrate the productivity coefficient in the educational sector, B, in consistence with a 
2% long-term, real economic growth rate in the U.S. We summarize these parameters in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3 Conditions for Indeterminacy 
We now simulate the model to see whether the BGP is a source, a sink or a saddle.  In the 
simulation, we maintain all the parameter values in Tables 2 and 3 except for parameter values 
concerning externality, γ and δ, and congestion, ψ.  Under different values for ψ≤0.5, we then 
simulate the region in the (δ, γ) plane separating equilibrium paths in the neighborhood of the 
unique BGP that is a source, a sink and a saddle.    We have found that for the region of δ<0.4 and 
γ<0.4, a sink appears for ψ∈[0,15, 0.27] and ψ∈[0.47, 0.5].    We illustrate the simulation results in 
a figure for a value of ψ in [0,15, 0.27] and [0.47, 0.5], respectively.            
First, we demonstrate the set of (δ, γ) separating a saddle, a sink and a source under ψ=0.2 in 
                                                      
8 While Ben-Gad (2003) chose α=0.285 and η=0.2, Raurich (2001) chose α=0.42 and η=0.1 in his 
decentralized economy and α=0.35 and η=0.2. in his centralized economy.    Benhabib and Perli (1994) used 
α=0.25.  Thus, our value of α and η lies in the range of the parameter values in these works.  Moreover, 
we will increase and decrease the value of α and η to assure the robustness of our quantitative results.   
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Figure 1, where the shaded area presents the set of (δ, γ) that exhibits indeterminate local dynamic 
paths in the neighborhood of the unique BGP, indicating that the BGP is a sink.  Several 
observations are in order.  First, the unique BGP is a sink under reasonable degrees of public 
investment externality, at δ=0.5% and γ=14.6%, and the region for a sink increases in (δ,  γ).  
Second, it is easy to see that under a degree of public spending externality in Sector Y, γ, the unique 
BGP is a saddle when the degree of public spending externality in Sector X, δ, is large, and the 
BGP becomes a sink as δ decreases to a certain value.    Finally, for a given δ, the BGP is a saddle 
when γ is small and as γ increases, the BGP becomes a sink. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Next, we report in Figure 2 the simulation results of the set of (δ, γ) separating a saddle, a sink 
and a source under ψ=0.5.    In this situation a sink is obtained under reasonable degrees of public 
spending externality, with a higher δ at 9% and a lower γ at 12.2%.  For other features, they are 
similar to those in Figure 1.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Finally, in order to examine the sensitivity of the above quantitative results, we conduct some 
robustness analysis.    In the analysis, we alter the value of one parameter from the benchmark case 
while keeping the values of all other parameters unchanged, and calibrate the value for B in 
consistence with the 2% economic growth rate.  We have experimented using a higher and lower 
time preference rate, a 50% increase and a 50% decrease in the reciprocal of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, an increase and a decrease in the share of physical capital in Sector Y and 
in Sector X.  The results are reported in Table 3, illustrating the range of ψ and the shape of the 
region of (δ, γ) that gives rise a sink.    In all cases there are two separating interval in the range of 
ψ for a sink, except for two situations.  The first case emerges when the contribution of physical 
capital in the Y sector is large, at α=0.42, under which the two intervals of the range of ψ for a sink 
are connected into an interval.    When ψ is small, the shape of the region of (δ, γ) that gives rise to 
a sink is similar to Figures 1, and when ψ increases, the shape in Figure 1 disappears and only the 
shape in Figure 2 emerges.    The second case emerges when the contribution of physical capital in 
the X sector is equal to or larger than its counterpart in the Y sector in the benchmark case, namely 
η≥α=0.3.    In this case, the two intervals of the range of ψ for a sink are collapsed into an interval, 
and a smaller interval as η increases further.    Moreover, only the shape of the region of (δ, γ) that 
gives  rise  to  a  sink  in  Figure  1  appears.            
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
   The above results document the combination of (δ, γ) for a BGP to be locally indeterminate.  
The required values of δ and γ for a sink seem to be reasonable.  When the congestion effect is 
taken into account, the simulated values of δ and γ net of the congestion effect imply a small 
required net degree of the external effect in public spending for local indeterminacy.
9   
It should be noted that the region of (δ, γ) for a sink in all Figures is located between the 
region for a source and the region for a saddle.  This is so because DetJ is positive for a source 
and is generally positive for a sink (cf. Table 1).  For a source, it needs a sufficiently large γ and 
also requires TrJ>0 and –BJ+DetJ/TrJ<0 (Row 5 in Table 1).  Under a given γ, we find that TrJ>0 
becomes quantitatively smaller as δ increases, and thus DetJ/TrJ>0 gets larger as δ  increases.  As 
δ increases to a critical value, DetJ/TrJ>0 dominates BJ>0 so –BJ+DetJ/TrJ changes from a 
negative to a positive value, and therefore the BGP changes from a source to a sink (Row 2 in Table 
1).  When δ is increased again, TrJ changes from a positive to a negative value, so both TrJ and 
DetJ/TrJ become negative, resulting in the condition in Row 3 in Table 1.  Finally, Γ1 becomes 
positive as δ is increased further, making DetJ to change from a positive to a negative value.  At 
the same time, TrJ and BJ also change signs and become positive and negative, respectively. Thus 
the BGP changes from a sink to a saddle (Row 6 in Table 1).   
To summarize the results, we obtain:   
 
Proposition 3 In a two-sector, human capital enhanced growth model with a congestion effect 
large enough, the equilibrium path in the neighborhood of the unique BGP is locally indeterminate 
under reasonable values for the degree of externality of the public services.     
 
4 The  Intuition 
The possibility of locally indeterminate equilibrium paths in the neighborhood of a BGP 
emerges when the marginal product from a firm’s perspective deviates from that from a social 
perspective.    Specifically, in this paper the marginal product of human/physical capital in Sector Y 
is decreasing in the fraction of human/physical capital employed in Sector Y from a private 
                                                      
9 For example, in a study using the panel data in U.S. and Japan, Shioji (2001) finds that the degree of 
externality for public capital is between 0.10 and 0.15.      
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perspective, but is increasing from a social perspective.    The reasons are as follows.     
Under a decreasing marginal product from a private perspective, a higher physical capital 
stock reduces the rewards to physical capital relative to the rewards to human capital.  However, 
such a higher physical capital stock also increases the ratio of the social marginal product of human 
capital in Sector Y, that is more physical capital intensive, to that in Sector X, that is less physical 
capital intensive.    At optimum, human capital is reallocated from Sector Y to Sector X, in order to 
reduce the marginal product of human capital in Sector Y to equalize the marginal product of 
human capital in both sectors.  Moreover, the fraction of physical capital employed in Sector X 
increases due to Pareto complements in the technology.  As the result of capital reallocation, 
output in Sector Y reduces while output in Sector X increases, resulting in a higher shadow price of 
goods Y to goods X.     
Given the above result that a higher capital stock reduces output in Sector Y, that is more 
physical capital intensive from a private perspective, the Rybczynski theorem fails.  As a duality, 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem also stops working, and thereby a rise in the reward of physical 
capital relative to human capital results in a fall in the price of goods Y.  In this situation, when 
the representative agent expects a higher price of goods Y relative to goods X, it would increase 
physical capital accumulation, as goods Y is more physical capital intensive from its own 
perspectives.  Such an increase in physical capital accumulation leads to reallocation of human 
capital, and the resulting reallocation of physical capital, from Sector Y to Sector X.  As a result, 
output Y decreases relative to output X, resulting in a higher price of goods Y relative to goods X.   
Therefore, the expectations are self-fulfilling in equilibrium.   
Formally, this possibility is better understood if we derive the marginal product of human 
capital in Sectors Y and X from a private perspective by differentiating (2.1)-(2.2), together with 
(2.3), to obtain: 








== − − −
∂
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                    ( 4 . 1 a )  
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                ( 4 . 1 b )  
where a substitution is made of the restrictions of constant returns on parameters, that is, 
1( 1 2 β αγ ψ =− − −  and  1 (1 2 ). θ ηδ ψ =− − −  
Output  y and x in (4.1a)-(4.1b) is evaluated at a social perspective, which is obtained 
if we substitute into (2.1) and (2.2) the government balance of budget in (2.6): 
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  In order to see how the marginal products of human capital in Sectors Y and X change as the 
fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y, u, increases, we differentiate the marginal products 
of human capital at a social perspective in Sectors Y and X with respect to u to obtain 
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        ( 4 . 3 b )  
 From (4.3a), the effect comes from two sources.  First, other things being equal, a larger 
fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y directly reduces the marginal product of human 
capital in Sector Y, represented by the second term in the first equality.  Moreover, a higher u 
increases the fraction of physical capital employed in Sector Y as well,
10 which indirectly increases 
the marginal product of human capital in Sector Y through Pareto complements, governed by the 
first term in the first equality.  In the situation without public service congestion, ψ=0, and the 
direct negative effect always dominates the indirect positive effect.    Indeed, the net effect depends 
upon the sign of −(v−u) in the second equality, which is negative under the construction that Sector 
Y is more physical capital intensive.    However, in the case when there is public service congestion, 
ψ>0. Under the requirement of a technology with a constant return in K, H, and G, the public 
service congestion reduces the marginal contribution of public services and increases the marginal 
contribution of the other two inputs.    As a result, the public service congestion mitigates the direct 
negative effect on the marginal product of human capital.    In the condition when ψ is sufficiently 
large, the indirect positive effect dominates the direct negative effect, making the net marginal 
product of human capital in Sector Y to increase in the fraction of human capital employed in this 
Sector.  
 
10 See (2.8), where the optimal u and v are positively related, because of the Pareto complements in K and H 
in the technology and the marginal rate of technical substitution between sectors at optimum.     
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From (4.3b), the effect originates from three channels.  First, other things being equal, a 
larger fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y and thus, a smaller fraction of human capital 
employed in Sector X,  directly increases the marginal product of human capital in Sector X, 
represented by the second term in the first equality.  Second, a larger fraction of human capital 
employed in Sector Y also leads to a larger fraction of physical capital employed in Sector Y and 
thus, a smaller fraction of physical capital employed in Sector X, which indirectly reduces the 
marginal product of human capital in Sector X through Pareto complements, whose effect is 
represented by the first term in the first equality.  Finally, a larger fraction of human capital 
employed in Sector Y, other things being equal, increases the output in Sector Y that increases 
public goods provision, which indirectly enhances the marginal product of human capital in Sector 
X, represented by the third and fourth terms in the first equality.    When there is no public service 
congestion, ψ=0, and the net effect is generally positive as long as δ is not too small.    When ψ>0, 
the public service congestion reduces the direct positive effect while increases the indirect positive 
through public goods provision, but the net effect is still positive as long as δ is not too small.  
Therefore, the net effect upon the marginal product of human capital in Sector X is generally 
increasing in the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y, regardless of the magnitude of the 
congestion parameter.   
Based on the above analysis, it is obvious that the marginal product of human capital in Sector 
Y relative to that in Sector X is decreasing in the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y, u, 
when there is no public service congestion.  When there is public service congestion, the relative 
marginal product of human capital between Sectors Y and X may be increasing in the fraction of 
human capital employed in Sector Y if the value of ψ is sufficiently large.  When ψ>0, it is 
required that γ be larger than δ in order for the relative marginal product of human capital between 
Sectors Y and X to increase in the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y. 
In the case when γ=δ, there is a symmetric public service congestion effect in Sectors Y and X.   
In this case, comparing the effect of a larger the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y 
upon the marginal product of human capital between Sector Y and X,
11 the first terms in the second 
equality in (4.3a) and (4.3b) totally offset each other, so the effect is determined by 
( ) (1 2 )(1 ) [ (1 )]( )
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employed in Sector Y.  Alternatively, when γ>δ, the first term in the second equality in (4.3a) is 
greater than that in (4.3b). When γ−δ>0 is sufficiently large and the resulting positive effect 
through ψ dominates the negative effects formed by other terms, the relative marginal product of 
human capital between Sectors Y and X is increasing in the fraction of human capital employed in 
Sector Y.
12  With these two cases, we are ready to illustrate the key results in relation to the 
Rybczynski  theorem.   
First, consider the case when ψ>0 and γ=δ and when γ>δ and ψ is small.  In this case, Γ1>0 
and the relative marginal product of human capital between Sectors Y and X is decreasing in the 
fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y.  This case is illustrated in Figure 3 with the 
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where Φ1 and Λ1 are as defined in (2.9a).  From (2.8c), given p, the rates of return to human 
capital between sectors must be equal at optimum, i.e. wy/wx=1 at optimum.   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Now, suppose that there is an increase in physical capital and thus, a higher physical to human 
capital ratio.  For a given relative shadow price of commodity, p, a higher z shifts the relative 
factor demand curve upwards (c.f. (4.4)), reasons being that it increases the marginal product of 
human capital in Sector Y relative to Sector X, since Sector Y is more physical capital intensive 
(Figure 3).  As the marginal product of human capital in Sector Y is decreasing in the fraction of 
human capital employed in Sector Y while the marginal product of human capital in Sector X is 
increasing in the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y, a reallocation of human capital is 
made from Sector X to Sector Y to reduce the marginal product of human capital in Sector Y 
relative Sector X so an optimum is recovered.    Through the Pareto complements in the technology, 
a fraction of physical capital is reallocated from Sector X to Sector Y.
13  As a result, a higher 
physical capital increases the output of the more physical capital intensive sector, Y, and decreases 
the output of the less physical capital intensive sector, X.    Such an outcome is consistent with the 
Rybczynski theorem.  As the duality of the Rybczynski theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
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13    This also can be seen from the positive relationship between u and v at optimum in (2.9a). 
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must hold.  Therefore, a higher physical capital stock decreases the return to physical capital 
relative to that to human capital, and decreases the shadow price of goods Y that is more physical 
capital intensive relative to the shadow price of goods X that is less physical capital intensive, 
leading to a positive relationship between relative factor rewards and relative commodity prices 
(Batra,  1973,  pp27-29).                    
Finally, consider the case when γ−δ>0 and ψ is sufficiently large so Γ1<0.  In this case, the 
relative marginal product of human capital between Sectors Y and X is increasing in the fraction of 
human capital employed in Sector Y, resulting in a relative factor demand curve for human capital 
between Sectors Y and X to increase in the fraction of human capital employed in Sector Y.  See 
Figure 4.     
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Now, suppose that there is an increase in physical capital and thus, a higher physical to human 
capital.  For a given relative shadow price of commodity, a higher z increases the marginal 
product of human capital in Sector Y relative to Sector X shifting the relative factor demand curve 
upwards (Figure 4).  At the original optimal human capital allocation, the marginal product of 
human capital in Sector Y is larger than that in Sector X (cf. point A′).  As now the marginal 
products of human capital in both Sectors Y and X are increasing in the fraction of human capital 
employed in Sector Y, it is necessary for human capital to reallocate from Sector Y to Sector X, in 
order to reduce (increase) the marginal product of human capital in Sector Y (X).    The reallocation 
is carried on until the marginal product of human capital equalizes in both sectors.  Through the 
Pareto complements in the technology, a fraction of physical capital is reallocated from Sector Y to 
Sector X.  As a result, output in Sector Y decreases while output in Sector X increases, which is 
not consistent with what is implied by the Rybczynski theorem.  As a duality, the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem must fail to satisfy.    Therefore, when physical capital stock increases, 
the returns to physical capital relative to that to human capital decrease, but output in Sector Y 
relative to output in Sector X decreases, thereby increasing the shadow price of goods Y relative to 
that to good X.  As a consequence, the relationship between the relative factor rewards for 
physical capital to that for human capital and the shadow price of goods Y, that is more physical 
capital intensive, to the shadow price of goods X, that is less physical capital intensive, is negative, 
rather than positive (Batra, 1973, pp30-32).   
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
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This paper establishes local indeterminacy in a constant-return, two-sector, human capital 
enhanced growth model with productive public spending.  The novelty of this paper has been to 
uncover the negative external effect in association with public goods service as a mechanism for 
establishing local indeterminate equilibrium.    Local indeterminacy in the paper emerges because a 
sufficient large congestion effect makes the marginal product, which is otherwise decreasing in a 
firm’s perspective, to increase in a social perspective.   
There are other extensions of this model, and we mention just one.    Two mechanisms, factor 
taxation and sector-specific externality, are employed to establish local indeterminacy in a constant, 
two-sector, human capital enhanced growth model. We may introduce into these models the 
productive public services to examine the robustness of their results concerning local indeterminacy.   
Moreover, we may add the congestion effect in the use of public spending services, and investigate 




This appendix derives in detail how the transformed system (2.11a)-(2.11c) is obtained.  
First, when we substitute (2.7b) into (2.7d), and substitute (2.7c) into (2.7e), together with (2.1), 
(2.2) and (2.6), we obtain: 
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where Φ1 and Λ1 are as defined in (2.9a). This equation is just (2.9a) and also indicate the vk/uh is a 
function of u and p.  
Finally, the system (2.11a)-(2.11c) is derived as follows.    We derive (2.11a) using (A.1), (A.2) 
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Table 1 
-1  * TrJ   * * * TrJ J J / Det B - +  




− − − − 3 sink
− +  + + 2 sink
−  −  − +2 s i n k
−  − ++ 2s i n k
− + − + 0 source
− +  + − 1 saddle 
− +  − − 1 saddle 




A  Growth rate  τ  γ  δ  ψ  ρ  σ  α  η B 
1 0.02  0.2  0.08  0.08  0.25  0.025 1.5 0.3 0.2  0.07872 
 
 
Table 3: Robustness 
Variations  B  Range of ψ for a sink 
Shape of region (δ,γ) for 
a sink 
Benchmark
1 0.07987  [0.15, 0.27] ; [0.47, 0.50]  Figure 1 and Figure 2 
ρ=0.01  0.04852  [0.11, 0.21] ; [0.48, 0.50]  Similar 
ρ=0.05  0.13802  [0.16, 0.25] ; [0.48, 0.50]  Similar 
σ=1  0.04802  [0.15, 0.27] ; [0.48, 0.50]  Similar 
σ=3  0.19037  [0.17, 0.26] ; [0.48, 0.50]  Similar 
α=0.25  0.08224  [0.10, 0.16] ; [0.35, 0.50]  Similar 
α=0.42  0.07091 [0.28,  0.50]    Similar
2
η=0.1(<α)  0.08567  [0.24, 0.35] ; [0.46, 0.50]  Similar 
η=0.25(<α)  0.07515  [0.12, 0.20] ; [0.48, 0.50]  Similar 
η=0.3(=α)  0.06974  [0.06, 0.14]  Similar to Figure 1 
η=0.35(>α)  0.06394  [0.06, 0.12]  Similar to Figure 1 
1. Benchmark parameters: A=1, B=0.07987, τ=0.2, ρ=0.025, σ=1.5, α=0.3, η=0.2, γ∈[0.01, 0.40], 
δ∈[0.01, 0.40]. 
2.  As  ψ increases from 0.28, the shape in Figure 1 disappears and only the shape in Figure 2 emerges. 
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Figure 1: ψ=0.2
 
Note:  A=1,  B=0.07987,  τ=0.2,  ρ=0.025,  σ=1.5,  α=0.3,  η=0.2. The
shaded area presents the region of indeterminacy and E1 is the lowest























Figure 2: ψ=0.5   
Note: A=1, B=0.07987, τ=0.2, ρ=0.025, σ=1.5, α=0.3, η=0.2. The
shaded area presents the region of indeterminacy and E2 is the lowest
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Figure 3: Human Capital Allocation between Sectors, 









































Figure 4: Human Capital Allocation between Sectors, 
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